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IMPORTS - CUMULATION AND UNFAIR TRADE
COMPETITION - CUMULATION DEEMED PROPER WHEN
A "REASONABLE OVERLAP" OF COMPETITION EXISTS.
Wieland Werke A.G. v. United States, 718 F. Supp.
50 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989)
In February 1987, the International Trade Commission (ITC) de-
termined that imports of brass sheet and strip from West Germany,
Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, the Republic of Korea, and Sweden'
were injuring a United States industry. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677
(7)(C)(iv)2, the Commission cumulated3 the statistics of the allegedly
dumped imports from producers in all seven of these nations when
determining that the domestic industry had been injured. 4 The In-
ternational Trade Commission also decided that even if the West
German imports were perceived to be of a higher quality, there was
reasonable overlap in competition between the West German brass
and the other imported and domestic brass to make the cumulation
proper.5
In July 1989, the West German producer, Wieland Werke, brought
suit in the United States Court of International Trade to challenge
I Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from France, Italy, Sweden, and West Germany,
USITC Pub. 1951, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-270 and 731-TA-313, 314, 316, 317 (Final)
(Feb. 1987) [hereinafter Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from France,. Italy, Sweden
and West Germany]. The law defines the term "industry" as domestic producers
as a whole of a like product, or those producers constituting a major proportion
of the total domestic production of that product. Palmeter, Injury Determinations
in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases - a Commentary to U.S. Practice,
21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 7, 14 (1987).
2 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (7)(C)(iv) (1984). This section addresses cumulation under
evaluation of volume and of price effects. The provision reads, "For purposes of
clauses (i) and (ii), the Commission shall cumulatively assess the volume and effects
of imports from two or more countries of like products subject to investigation if
such products compete with each other and with like products of the domestic
industry in the United States market."
I Cumulation in an antidumping or countervailing duty investigation is the ag-
gregation of the injury data of all imports in the particular industy. Cumulation
allows for greater protection of the United States industry because the effect of an
import will be measured not by its impact alone, but by the impact of all imports
of the product on the domestic industry. Hayes, Antidumping and Countervailing
Duties, 23 TEx. INT'L L.J. 505 (1988).
4 Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from France, Italy, Sweden, and West Germany,
supra note 1 at 314.
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the decision of the ITC to cumulate their imports with the dumped
and subsidized imports of the other producers. 6 Plaintiff Wieland
Werke contended that it competed in a separate high quality special
characteristic submarket not served by other imports and therefore
was erroneously cumulated with the other investigated imports. 7 The
Commission defended its competition analysis by comparing nine
categories of brass products with standard dimensions. 8 Based on
these nine categories, there was substantial evidence that purchasers
whose primary interest was quality purchased brass from several
foreign suppliers and that purchasers frequently bought West German
brass based on its price and availability rather than quality. 9
The United States Court of International Trade held, affirmed.
Even though one producer's imports are perceived to be of a higher
quality, when there is a reasonable overlap in competition between
that producer's imports and the other producer's imports, cumulation
is proper. Wieland Werke, A.G. v. United States, 718 F. Supp. 50
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
LEGAL BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION
Prior to the 1984 Act,10 the Commission's cumulation process was
characterized by inconsistency and confusion." Without the benefit
of a cumulation statute or congressional policy, the Commission in
effect left the decision of whether to cumulate to the discretion of
the individual commissioners.' 2 Cumulation was used to test injury
6 Wieland Werke, A.G. v. United States, 718 F. Supp. 50 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
Id. at 51.
Id. at 52. Sales data was available for West German imports in seven of the
nine standard categories: products one (builder's hardware), two (slitting stock, 0.02
to 0.25 inch thick), three (communication and electronics, 0.01 inch to 0.013 inch
thick), five (slitting stock, .016 to .0199 inch thick), six (reroll, .0061 to .012 inch
thick), seven (reroll, .081 to .125 inch thick); and nine (lamp shells and sockets,
.011 inch to .016 inch thick).
9 Id. at 54.
10 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) is often referred to as the 1984 Act.
1 Bingham & Taylor Div., Virginia Indus. v. United States, 815 F.2d 1482, 1484
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
12 Id. at 1485; see also Mock, Cumulation of Import Statistics in Injury Inves-
tigations before the International Trade Commission, 7 NW J. INT'L L. & Bus. 433,
439 (1986) [hereinafter Mock]; Palmeter, Injury Determinations in Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Cases - A Commentary on U.S. Practice, 21 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 7, 35 (1986) [hereinafter Palmeter].
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in antidumping 3 but was not allowed in duty investigations. 14 For
the commissioner's benefit, the Commission developed a standard
market analysis approach to use when determining whether cumu-
lation was proper."
The 1984 Act replaced the commisioner's discretion with a statutory
standard.' 6 Once the Commission demonstrates that cumulation is
proper, the 1984 Act mandates the use of cumulation in injury
determinations. 7 The Commission must now consider two criteria
when determining whether to cumulate.' s First, the imports to be
cumulated must compete with each other and with the domestic
product they allegedly injure.' 9 Second, the imports must be "subject
to investigation. '20
When considering whether imports compete with each other and
with the United States production, the ITC normally considers several
factors. The first is the degree of fungibility between imports from
,1 Mock, at 439. See also USITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-F-186 (June
1981).
14 E.g., Hot Rolled Carbon Steel Plate from Romania, Belgium, and Brazil,
USITC Pub. 1208, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-83-84 (Prelim.) (Jan. 1982); Hot Rolled Carbon
Steel Sheet from France, USITC Pub. 1206, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-85 (Prelim.) (Jan.
1982). The first cumulation decision was in 1968 in Pig Iron from East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the USSR, T.C. Pub. 265, Inv. Nos. AA1921-52
(Sept. 1968).
1s Authority for this action was derived from the legislative history of the Trade
Act of 1974 which instructed the Commission to consider "the factors and condition
of trade affecting the market in these goods." These factors were: 1) volume of
subject imports, 2) trend of import volume, 3) fungibility of imports, 4) competition
in the market for same end users, 5) common channels of distribution, 6) pricing
similarity, 7) simultaneous impact, and 8) coordinated action by the importers.
Mock, supra note 12, at 439.
16 Id. at 440.
,7 USX Corp. v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 487 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (Where
the conditions of trade indicate cumulation would be appropriate, it may be arbitrary
and an abuse of discretion to fail to cumulate.); Lone Star Steel Co. v. United
States, 650 F. Supp. 183 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) (cumulation was mandated).
18 LMI - LaMetalli Industriale, S.P.A. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 959 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1989); Mock, supra note 12, at 441.
9 LMI, 712 F. Supp. at 969.
The question of whether imports are "subject to investigation" is a difficult
one. All imports are not automatically subject to investigation. Some reason must
be shown. The clearest case occurs when imports from several countries enter the
United States at the same time, when they all benefit from the same kind of unfair
trade practice, and when the domestic industry files simultaneous petitions. Diffi-
culties arise when petitions are filed at different times, or different unfair trade
practices are alleged. Mock, supra note 12, at 442. See also Bingham & Taylor v.
United States, 815 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Chaparral Steel Co. v. United States,
698 F. Supp. 254 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
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different countries and between imports and the domestic like product,
including consideration of specific customer requirements and other
quality-related questions .21 The second factor is the presence of sales,
or offers to sell, in the same geographic markets as imports from
different countries and the domestic like product. 22 The third is the
existence of common or similar channels of distribution for imports
from different countries and the domestic like product, and the fourth
factor is whether the prices of imports and the domestic like product
are within a reasonable range. 23 The fifth factor is whether the imports
are simultaneously present in the market. 24
There are two situations where cumulation is essential to the in-
vestigation of injury25 and also to the enforcement of countervailing
duty law. 26 The first occurs when a number of subsidized sources,
none of which could injure the domestic industry by itself, combine
to do injury to the industry. 27 The second occurs when a single
subsidized source, again not sufficient to individually cause injury to
the industry, adds to the injury caused by larger sources. 21
21 Granges Metallverkeg, A.B. v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 17, 19 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1989).
22 Id.
21 Id. In Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from France, supra note 1, the ITC did
not consider this factor in its determination to cumulate. See Granges Metallverken,
A.B. v. United States, 716 F. Supp. (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989) (The court specifically
addresses the fact that this was left out). See also infra, note 70.
2 Mock, supra note 12, at 441. See also Granges Metallverken, A.B. v. United
States, 716 F. Supp. 17 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
25 Chaparral Steel Co. v. United States, 698 F. Supp. 254, 258 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988). Congress mandated cumulation to "eliminate inconsistencies in Commission
practice and to ensure that the injury test adequately addresses simultaneous unfair
imports from different countries." See H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
37, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4910, 5164.
Republic Steel Co. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640, 644 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984).
2 Id. See also Fundicao Tupy, S.A. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 898 (1988),
aff'd, 859 F.2d 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988) which held that the cumulation provision
authorized an action by the ITC to cumulate despite plaintiffs' argument of lack
of a "contributing effect." The court in Tupy, adhering to the holding in USX
Corp. v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 487 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), stated that the
"contributing effect" test was held to be improperly applied when it created a process
of circular reasoning that rendered cumulation a vestigial part of the causation
analysis. Further, the court noted the legislative history, which specifically indicated
that a requirement in the bill as introduced was that imports from each country
have a "contributing effect."
28 Republic Steel Co. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
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The 1984 Act also raised a constitutional issue of fairness. The
court in Fundicao Tupy, S.A. v. United States,29 held that the op-
eration of the cumulation provision does not raise a due process
issue" since the conditions upon which cumulation depend are clearly
set out in the law and once the merchandise from any country becomes
part of the group of merchandise being subject to a determination
of injury, the constitutional right of due process is satisfied.3'
Although the 1984 Act mandates the use of cumulation in injury
determinations,3 2 the Act does not specifically mandate cross-cumu-
lation. Cross-cumulation is either the aggregation of injury data
concerning subsidized imports in an antidumping injury investigation
or the aggregation of injury data concerning dumped imports in a
countervailing duty investigation." Thus, cross-cumulation is essen-
tially an extension of cumulation that allows the ITC to aggregate
the effects of both subsidized and dumped imports on the United
States.34 In Bingham & Taylor v. United States,35 the court read cross-
cumulation into the statute and held that 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (7)(C)(iv)
requires the ITC to assess cumulatively the volume and price effects
of imports subject to an antidumping investigation together with
imports of like products subject to a countervailing duty investigation
when making its preliminary injury determinations.16
Since cumulation is required by law when it is deemed proper, the
key issue is the appropriateness of cumulation. One of the essential
factors in determining the appropriateness of cumulation is whether
29 Fundicao Tupy, S.A. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 898 (1988), aff'd, 859
F.2d 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
30 The plaintiffs in Tupy objected to the ITC's action on constitutional grounds,
alleging that the statute did not provide standards for enforcement of the law and
therefore violated due process of law. Id. at 902.
31 Id.
32 There are cases in which cumulation was not mandated. The court in Asociacion
Columbiana de Exportadore de Flores v. United States, 693 F. Supp. 1165 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988), held that the ITC was not required to use cumulation in a threat
investigation, although it was not prohibited from doing so.
33 Hayes, supra note 3, at 508.
34 E.g., Granges Metallverken A.B. v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 17 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1989); see also Hayes, supra note 3, at 508.
11 815 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1987). This decision was followed by the ITC in
Industrial Phosphoric Acid from Belgium and Israel, USITC Pub. 2000, Inv. No.
701-TA-286 (Final) Inv. No. 731-TA-36 (Final) (Aug. 1987) (imports of industrial
phosphoric acid subsidized by Government of Israel and dumped from Belgium).
36 Bingham & Taylor, 815 F.2d at 1482. The court held that subsidized light iron
construction castings from Brazil had to cumulate with dumped light construction
castings from India, Canada, and the People's Republic of China. Id. at 1486.
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the imports compete with each other.3 7 In analyzing whether imports
compete with each other, the Commission uses the five factor test
mentioned previously. When the ITC determines that cumulation is
appropriate," it must then consider arguments from the various prod-
ucers against cumulation. The case of Granges Metallverken A.B. v.
United States 9 provides a good example of the arguments producers
typically make. There, the plaintiff argued that the decision to cu-
mulate was erroneous because the Commission failed to give proper
weight to evidence relating to fungibility of the imported goods. 40
The plaintiff's main contention was that the quality of its brass was
superior to the quality of the brass manufactured by other producers
under investigation.4 1 Metallverken further argued that the other im-
ports were not as substitutable for domestic products due to differ-
ences in lead times, metal-fixing methods, and quality considerations.4 2
The plaintiffs also argued that quality was the major factor considered
by most purchasers in determining brass sheet and strip purchases.4 1
Granges Metallverken's final argument was that it manufactured brass
for caskets and the Commission failed to account for the fact that
" See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
3 See e.g., Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from Brazil, Canada, and the Republic
of Korea, USITC Pub. 1930, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-269, and 731-TA-311 (Final) (Dec
1986); Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from France, Italy, Sweden, and West Germany,
supra note 1.
39 716 F. Supp. 17 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
"0Id. at 18.
41 Id. at 20. Plaintiffs argument was that (1) the French primarily produce brass
reroll of standard quality while Metallverken does not sell reroll products; (2) the
German produce high-quality brass, as does Granges Metallverken, but brass products
from these two countries do not compete because the Swedes sell especially thin
gauges for unique applications with which the German producers do not compete;
(3) imports from Italy, Korea, and Canada do not compete with the Swedish imports
"due to quality reasons and due to the fact that they are engaged primarily in
producing and selling more standardized products rather than the speciality brass
produced by Granges Metallverken," and (4) Brazilian brass does not compete with
the Swedish product "because Brazilian product does not compete in the higher
quality markets."
42 Id.
41 Id. This argument was based on a customer survey conducted by the Commission
staff. The survey indicated that 64% cited quality as the most important factor in
purchases and over 85% ranked price and quality in the top three factors they
considered when buying. Additionally, "approximately one half of the largest end-
users stated that imported Swedish brass sheet and strip was superior to U.S. produced
brass," and two distributors reported that mills in Sweden, West Germany, France,
and Italy "produce brass strip with a better finish, or surface quality, and that
some customers believe that finish is an indicator of metallurgical quality."
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there was no domestic production of brass for caskets during the
investigation period."
Weighing arguments such as those cited by Granges Metallverken,
the court must determine whether there is a "reasonable overlap" in
competition among imports and domestic products. 45 The court in
Florex v. United States held that completely overlapping markets are
not a prerequisite.4 Applying this analysis in Certain Cast Iron Pipe
Fittings from Brazil, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, the Com-
mission determined that cumulation was proper based on "reasonable
overlap" in the geographical and end-user markets in which the
imports and the domestic like product were sold, despite alleged
difference in quality and evidence that certain products were pre-
dominantly sold in discrete end-use markets.4 7 Similarly, the court in
Fundicao Tupy S.A. v. United States,4 affirmed the Commission's
decision to cumulate, 49 holding that it was reasonable to find sufficient
evidence of overlap in the end-use market given the "fungibility and
similar quality of the imports, the similar channels of distribution,
the similar time period involved, and the geographic overlap of the
markets." 50
" Id. at 21. Plaintiffs reasoned that the Commission's determination that these
products were fungible was not supported by substantial evidence considering the
plaintiff's minimal market penetration ratios, the fact that a significant portion of
that small market penetration consists of products that were not produced domes-
tically during most of the investigation period, and the lack of fungibility.
" It is not the court's function to reweigh the evidence, but to decide whether
the Commission's determinations are supported by substantial evidence. 19 U.S.C.§
1516 a(b)(1)(B); Id. at 6; Citrusuo Paulista, S.A. v. United States, 704 F. Supp.
1075, 1093 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988), aff'd, 708 F. Supp. 1333 (1989); Matsushita Elec.
Ind. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1984). "Substantial evidence
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion." Universal Camera Co. v. Nat. Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 477
(1951).
46 705 F. Supp. 582, 592 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989). Here, the court held that the
plaintiff's argument, that competition between Mexican imports and other imports
was limited because of differing ports of entry, was not convincing since completely
overlapping markets are not required. See also Tupy, 678 F. Supp. at 902.
41 Certain Cast Iron Pipe Fittings from Brazil, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan
USITC Pub. 1849, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-278-80 (Final), (May 1986).
41 678 F. Supp. 898, (1988) aff'd, 859 F.2d 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
41 Id. The evidence included marketing data from large purchaseres of the product,
testimony at the hearing, advertisements, and other material which tended to show
that there was competition between the imports from Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan in
the residential construction and commercial/industrial end-user markets.
S0 Id. at 902.
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In the abovementioned case of Granges Metallverken A.B. v. United
States," the Commission had found that even if some domestic
purchasers perceived Swedish brass to be of a higher quality than
other imports, there was "reasonable overlap" in competition among
imported and domestic brass, and therefore cumulation was proper.12
The plaintiff, Granges Metallverken, appealed this decision to the
United States Court of International Trade, arguing that there was
no substantial evidence to support cumulation because the Commis-
sion failed to account for fungibility" and did not determine whether
imported and domestic products were within a reasonable price range. 4
The court in Granges adopted the Commissioner's reasoning that
despite a product being delivered to the customer with unique qual-
ities, it does not make it noncompetitive in the steel industry if other
importers are also selling the same general merchandise to the same
customer.5 The commission analyzed competition among standard
brass sheet and strip by comparing sales of nine categories of brass
products using dimensions established by the Commission as common
denominators in the industry. 6 Available sales data showed only a
slight variation in price among Swedish and domestic products.57 The
record also supported a finding of competition among the imports
since many different nations imported the same products from prod-
ucers in different nations. 8
In Granges, the plaintiff argued that quality was the main consid-
eration for purchasers when buying brass products.5 9 The Commission
' 716 F. Supp. 17 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
52 Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from France, Italy, Sweden, and West Germany,
supra note 1. This was the same decision used in Werke.
See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
716 F. Supp. at 19 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
I d. at 22. The fact that Swedish casket brass was sold in the United States
without a domestic cournterpart for most of the period under investigation does not
undermine the Commission's conclusion that Swedish brass competed with domestic
and other imported brass.
56 Id.
17 Id. at 23. The products compared were product one (builder's hardware),
product two (slitting stock .02 to .25 thick), and product five (slitting stock .016
to .0199 inch thick), as well as electrical stamping and wiring imports.
1s See generally Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from France, Italy, Sweden, and
West Germany, supra note 1. Product one was sold by Swedish, Brazilian, French,
Italian, Korean, and West German producers. Id. at 70, B36. Product two was sold
by Swedish, Brazilian, Canadian, French, Italian, Korean, and West German prod-
ucers. Id. at 73. Product three was sold by Swedish, French and West German
producers. Id. at 73. Product five was sold by Swedish, Brazilian, Canadian, Italian,
Korean, and West German producers. Id. at A96.
19 Granges Metallverken A.B. v. United States, 716 F. Supp. at 22.
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conceded that quality appeared to be a major factor in a purchaser's
decision, but noted that price was also a major factor.w Of course,
the Commission is not required to track every sale of every product
to show that all imports compete with all other imports and all
domestic like products. The Commission simply is required "to find
evidence of reasonable overlap in competition to support its deter-
mination to cumulate imports.' '61 Plaintiff's final argument, that
almost all of their imports were of uniquely high quality, was un-
dermined by showings of comparable quality among the other im-
ports. 62 Rejecting all of these arguments, the court held that the
record supported a finding of "reasonable overlap" in competition.6 3
ANALYSIS
Under a strict interpretation of existing case law, the court in
Wieland Werke, A.G. v. United States4 correctly determined that
even if West German imports were perceived to be of a higher quality,
cumulation was proper based on a finding of "reasonable overlap"
in competition. The court in Wieland Werke essentially duplicated
its reasoning in Granges5 in addressing the issue of competition. In
both cases the plaintiffs argued that because of their higher degree
of quality, the competition requirement necessary to invoke the cu-
mulation statute was not met.66 The court in Wieland Werke again
used the nine standard categories of brass products established by
the Commission in Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from France, Italy,
Sweden, and West Germany,67 and compared each product with re-
spect to how many different importers sold that particular product.
Expanding the quality argument, plaintiff stated that it sold to a
distinct high-quality submarket comprised of end-users who required
6 Id.
61 Id. "Competition" is defined as "rivalry in the marketplace, where goods will
be bought from those who, in view of the purchasers, provide the 'most for the
money'." J. P. FRMDMAN, DICTIONARY OF BusINEss TERMS 109 (1987). Thus, it
would not be unreasonable for the Commission to find that domestic purchasers
prefer to purchase higher quality products at a lower price than other goods considered
to be inferior.
62 Granges Metaliwerker, 716 F. Supp. at 23.
63 Id.
" 718 F. Supp. 50 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
65 Granges Metallwerken, 716 F. Supp. at 19.
66 Id. at 19; Wieland Werke, 718 F. Supp. at 52.
67 Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from France, Italy, Sweden, and West Germany,
supra note 1 at 316.
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special quality or special characteristics and only brass manufactured
by German companies, a handful of domestic producers, the Japanese,
and the Swedish producers could compete in this submarket because
other imports lacked the necessary quality. 68 The Swedish importers
in Granges also made this argument, but in both instances, the court
relied on the Commission's findings that West German, Brazilian,
Italian, Korean, and Swedish imports all competed for the same
sales. 69 Further, the court in Wieland Werke also relied on the Com-
mission's finding of substantial evidence that purchasers specifically
interested in quality often purchased brass from several foreign sup-
pliers, and that purchasers frequently bought West German imports
based on price and availability rather than quality. 70
The holdings in Granges and Werke logically followed the holding
in Tupy. There the court considered geographical, quality, and fun-
gibility aspects similar to those used in Werke and Granges.7' All
three of these holdings stem from the holdings in USX Corporation
v. United States72 and Bingham & Taylor v. United States" that
mandating the use of cumulation and cross-cumulation.
The holdings in Wieland Werke and Granges will probably have
two results: more claims by the domestic industry and less variation
in the quality of imported goods. These two cases make it easier to
6 Wieland Werke, 718 F. Supp. at 53. These end-users used brass to manufacture
computers, aerospace products, fasteners, connectors, and other high technology
applications. Plaintiff further argued that this submarket required brass of the highest
quality in terms of tolerances, surface, chemical, and physical conditions.
69 Unlike Fundicao Tupy, S.A. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 898 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988), aff'd, 859 F.2d 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988) the evidence in this case is
uncontested that the same domestic users of brass purchased brass from several
different sources.
70 The similarity between Granges and Wieland Werke makes it plausible to group
the near-identical holdings when analyzing the correctness of the Commission's
determination to cumulate. The court in Wieland Werke addressed every situation
in Granges except the complaint that the Commission did not specifically address
reasonable price range. This issue also could have been addressed in Wieland Werke;
however, the court in Granges was strongly supported by case law that stated there
was no requirement for the Commission to conduct a price range analysis in an
injury investigation. See Negev Phospates, Ltd. v. United States, 699 F. Supp 938,
942 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); National Ass'n of Mirror Mfrs. v. United States, 696
F. Supp 642, 648 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988). The court in Wieland Werke did however
discredit the plaintiffs complaint of methodology with similar arguments.
1' Fundicao Tupy, S.A. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 898 (1988), aff'd, 859
F.2d 915, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
72 655 F. Supp. 487 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
71 815 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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invoke the cumulation statute in injury determinations, allowing greater
protection of the domestic industry from unfair trade practices. Since
relief can be obtained more easily, there will be an increase in claims
against importers for alleged dumping and subsidizing.74 United States
producers could easily use this ruling to their advantage in attempts
to eliminate competition.
This could lead to harsh results for small quantity importers. The
major suppliers cause most of the injury to the domestic industry,
but if cumulation is mandated based on a "reasonable overlap," the
International Trade Commission will hold the small importer just as
responsible as the major supplier causing the smaller importers to be
punished along with the major suppliers. 7
This decision may also result in international political conflict.7 6
Since it will be easier find injury caused by a combination of dumping
and subsidizing, the subsidies granted to foreign industries by their
government will also be more likely to run afoul of Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty statutes.7 7 The result may be excessive duties
which will in effect nullify the govern subsidies that are vital to many
foreign industries. 71 While this relaxed standard will be beneficial to
the United States, it may result in the elimination of small importers'
products from the United States marketplace. By protecting the United
States in this way, foreign countries may retaliate by increasing trade
barriers. This would ultimately injure the domestic manufacturers. 79
A second disadvanageous result of these holdings is that quality
may be reduced. If importers realize that despite their efforts to
provide a high-quality product with special characteristics, they will
still be considered "competing" with lesser imports, they may reduce
their quality. Further, the financial risk of having their products
cumulated may force importers of higher quality products to reduce
quality in order to reduce costs.8 0 The result will be less variation in
quality as importers try to obtain the median quality. To maintain
higher standards would be futile since it could still be shown that
they have a "reasonable overlap" in the market.
74 Hayes, supra note 3, at 513.
" Id. at 513-14; Palmeter, supra note 1, at 37.
76 Hayes, supra note 3, at 513.
77 Id.
71 Id.
79 Id. at 515. See also Mock, supra note 12, at 441.
90 Hayes, supra note 3, at 515; Mock, supra note 12, at 452.
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CONCLUSION
Precedent makes Werke a sound decision. Undoubtedly the do-
mestic producers will welcome this relaxed method of measuring
overlap in competition as a measure to combat foreign competition.
However, it may have some far-reaching effects for overall United
States industrial competitiveness because the quality and quantity of
foreign products available in the United States will be reduced, causing
the American consumer to suffer.
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